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ABSTRACT:  We evaluate a program that introduced bilingual education in English and 
Spanish in primary education in some public schools of the Madrid region in 2004. Under this 
program students not only study English as a foreign language but also some subjects (at least 
Science, History and Geography) are taught in English. Spanish and Mathematics are taught only 
in Spanish. The first class receiving full treatment finished Primary education in June 2010 and 
they took the standardized test for all 6th grade students in Madrid on the skills considered 
\indispensable" at that age. This test is our measure of the outcome of primary education to 
evaluate the program. We have to face a double self-selection problem. One is caused by schools 
who decide to apply for the program, and a second one caused by students when choosing school. 
We take several routes to control for these selection problems. The main route to control for self-
selected schools is to take advantage of the test being conducted in the same schools before and 
after the program was implemented in 6th grade. To control for students self-selection we 
combine the use of several observable characteristics (like parents' education and occupation) 
with the fact that most students were already enrolled at the different schools before the program 
was announced. Our results indicate that there is a clear negative effect on learning the subject 
taught in English for children whose parents have less than upper secondary education, and no 
clear effect for anyone on mathematical and reading skills, which were taught in Spanish. 
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1 Introduction
Knowledge of a second language is widely believed to be essential for workers to succeed in
an increasingly interconnected business world, and researchers tend to agree. Ginsburgh
and Prieto-Rodr´ıguez (2011), for example, found large estimates of the effects of foreign
language knowledge on wages in Mincerian regressions: the increases in wages ranged be-
tween 11 percent in Austria and 39 percent in Spain for knowledge of the English language
and even higher effects for knowledge of other languages.1,2 The returns to learning En-
glish do not only flow to individuals, the country as a whole may also benefit: Fidrmuc
and Fidrmurc (2009) show, for example, that widespread knowledge of languages is an
important determinant for foreign trade, with English playing an especially important
role.
The private initiative has taken notice of these benefits of second language acquisition.
Many schools, in Spanish speaking countries especially those that cater to the elites, offer
bilingual education for their pupils; Banfi and Day (2004) document this for Argentina,
and Ordon˜ez (2004) for Colombia. The high returns for foreign language capabilities,
and probably also the association with elite schools, have prompted several Spanish ad-
ministrations to offer bilingual education in schools across the country. The ministry of
education sponsors an agreement with the British Council that selects 80 schools all over
Spain where instruction in English occupies a large percentage of the curriculum. Much
more ambitious in scale is a program in the autonomous region of Madrid which at present
enrolls 340 public schools (276 primary schools and 64 high schools)3 where around 40 per-
cent of the instruction, including all the science curriculum, is taught in English.4 These
programs have been so successful with voters that both major parties have included in
their 2011 general election platforms the promise of extending the program to the whole
nation.5
It is thus clear, both to researchers and the general public, that learning a foreign
language is important for economic reasons. But it also has some costs. The more obvious
are the financial ones: the teachers may need to be hired, trained, or retrained, and given
the market value of English knowledge they will be more costly than other teachers; some
1An earlier analysis of the same data, by Williams (2011) found a smaller impact: between 5 percent
in Austria or Finland, to insignificant in Spain or France. But the reanalysis of Ginsburgh and Prieto-
Rodr´ıguez (2011) used more powerful techniques to control for endogeneity.
2The effects on U.S. workers are rather smaller, as one would expect from the lingua franca status of
English. See for example Fry and Lowell (2003) who find no effect on wages, or Saiz and Zoido (2005) who
find an effect of about 5%.
3The 276 primary schools represent 35% of the total number of public schools and the 64 high schools
represent 20% of the total number of high schools in the region of Madrid.
4Andalusia also has a bilingual program, but the percentage of instruction in English is smaller, around
20 percent of the instruction time.
5See e.g. in the program of the socialist party PSOE the statement “we will support the design of
linguistic projects to support the learning of English. We will also support the schools offering bilingual
education both in vocational training and at the university,”(available at: http : //www.rubalcaba.es/wp−
content/uploads/2011.pdf/10/progpsoe2011.pdf) or the one of conservative party PP, which states “We
will promote Spanish-English bilingualism in the whole educational system from kindergarten to univer-
sity”, (available at: http : //www.pp.es/actualidad− noticia/programa− electoral − pp5741.html).
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extra conversation assistants may need to be hired; if successful, demand will grow and the
program may need to be expanded. But in addition to these costs time is finite, and there
is hardly ever a free lunch in educational issues; so there may be other negative effects
from the policy. The aim of this paper is precisely to test whether bilingual educational
programs have a cost in terms of slower learning rates in other subjects.
To test this idea we look at data from the bilingual education program in the region
of Madrid. Although we will describe it in more detail later, the program (for primary
schools) basically consists on using English to teach the subject called “Knowledge of the
Environment”, that includes all teaching of Science, History and Geography. English is
also used as the educational medium for Art and sometimes Physical Education, and of
course the English language classes. Overall, teaching in English comprises between 10
and 12 of the 25 weekly hours of instruction.
To find out the effects of the program we use a standardized exam that has been
administered each year in all primary schools from the Spanish region of Madrid to 6th
grade students (12-13 years of age), starting with the school year 2004/05. The exam
tests for what are called “Indispensable Knowledge and Skills” in three areas: Spanish
language, Mathematics and General Knowledge; the latter basically corresponds to the
material taught in “Knowledge of the Environment”. The exam results are anonymous,
but each student answers a questionnaire that includes a host of socioeconomic background
variables, which we can use as covariates. We use data from the first group of schools that
became bilingual in the region of Madrid in 2004/05, and we checked the results of the
student cohorts which took the exam in 2009/10 and in 2010/11. We then repeat the
analysis with the second group of schools that became bilingual for their first bilingual
cohort, whose students took the exam in 2010/11. In order to control for endogeneity
problems, we use a Difference in Difference approach, comparing the exam results of
children in the treated schools before and after they became bilingual with the group of
non-bilingual schools before and after the treatment.
We find that the effect of the program is not significantly different from zero for either
Mathematics or Spanish language, although it goes from positive to negative. For General
Knowledge, the bilingual program has a negative and significant effect on the exam results,
for children of parents without a college education. The size of this effect is substantial, on
the order of 0.2 standard deviations.6 Since General Knowledge is the only subject taught
in English from the three present in the exam, it would appear that the extra effort made
to use English as the medium of instruction comes at the expense of a worsening in the
learning of that subject. A possible caveat to that conclusion is that the exam is taken
in Spanish and the subject is learnt in English. But, taken at face value, this would also
suggest that the level of linguistic competence in English is not enough to leap through
that barrier. All in all, the conclusion must be that there is indeed no free lunch: either
6This is close in magnitude to the effects found by Angrist and Lavy (1999) in Israel for a class reduction
of 8 students, and by Krueger (1999) for the Tennessee STAR experiment, which reduced class size in 7
students.
3
the learning of subjects taught in English is impaired, or the learning of English itself is
not very good.
In the group of schools that started to participate in 2004 the results for the second
cohort of students exposed to the program are very similar, even quantitatively, to those of
the first cohort. However, for the group of schools that started to participate in 2005, the
effects are also negative and significant only for General Knowledge, but they are smaller
in size and only for children of parents with less than upper secondary education. We
conjecture that this is due to a better selection of those schools in terms of the English
knowledge of the teachers, since for that group of schools the conditions to be a part of
the program were made stricter in that dimension.
There is a large body of research aimed at understanding the effects of bilingual ed-
ucation programs for immigrants in the U.S. This literature finds mostly positive results
of those programs. Willig (1985) concludes that the better the experimental design of
the study, the more positive were the effects of bilingual education, and Greene (1998)
in another meta-study of the literature asserts that: “an unbiased reading of the schol-
arly research suggests that bilingual education helps children who are learning English.”
Jepsen (2009), on the other hand finds that “students in bilingual education have sub-
stantially lower English proficiency than other English Learners in first and second grades.
In contrast, there is little difference between bilingual education and other programs for
students in grades three through five.” But those are typically programs for immigrants
into a foreign country so the external validity to our population of those results is rather
unclear.
There is much less evidence regarding the effects of bilingual education in English for
countries whose official language is not English. An exception is Admiraal, Westhoff and
de Bot (2006), who study the effect of the use of English as the language of instruction
for secondary education in The Netherlands. They state that: “No effects have been
found for receptive word knowledge and no negative effects have been found with respect
to the results of their school leaving exams at the end of secondary education for Dutch
and subject matters taught through English.” It is hard to know what to make of the
differences between our two studies, since the educational systems are very different, as
are the societies where the programs are administered. But an intriguing question arises:
could the costs of bilingual education be lowered if the program was started in high school?
This is an important question for further research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in some detail the institutional
setup and the program. Section 3 discusses the data and the econometric model. Section
4 contains the main results of the paper and it has some additional estimations and
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Institutional Background and Description of the Program
The order from the regional ministry of Madrid that initiated the bilingual school program
argues that it is needed because: “The full integration of Spain in the European context
implies that students need to acquire more and better communication skills in different
European languages. Being able to develop their daily and professional activities using
English as a second language opens new perspectives and new relationship possibilities
to students of bilingual schools in the Autonomous Region of Madrid.” The integrated
European labor and trading market is thus the reason used by the administration for
fostering the program.
This is a good reasoning, in the current recession with a general unemployment rate
above 20 percent and a youth unemployment rate of almost 50 percent, only 36,967
Spaniards emigrated in 2010. This contrasts markedly with the 4 million unemployed,
or with the 40,000 yearly emigrants that Bergin et al. (2009) estimate for Ireland, a coun-
try 10 times smaller than Spain and with half its unemployment rate. Of course, there are
many reasons for this, Bentolila and Ichino (2008) argue that the welfare state and the
family make it possible to accommodate big unemployment shocks, but the welfare state
and the family are similar in Spain and Ireland, so it is indeed quite likely that the lack
of proficiency of adult Spanish cohorts in English is one problem hindering the emigration
that the unemployment figures would suggest should be a safety valve for the situation.
The Spanish educational system is composed of 6 years of primary school, 4 years
of compulsory secondary education (E.S.O.) and 2 years of non-compulsory education,
which is divided into vocational training (ciclos formativos) and preparation for college
(bachillerato). There are also three years of free publicly funded pre-school, from ages 3
to 5. The pre-school children share the premises with those in primary school. Also, the
pre-schoolers in one location have precedence over other children applying to the same
primary school. As a consequence of this precedence rule most students at the primary
level come from the preschool in the same location. In fact, if all the vacancies for three
years old are filled and none of them leaves the school at the primary level, there will
not be any vacancies at that level in that cohort. As a result, the school choice is almost
universally made when the student is three years old. After that time, school changes are
not frequent, because it becomes extremely difficult to enter schools with high demand.
The facts mentioned about school choice and selection in the previous paragraph are
important for our study. The bilingual program is applied at the primary school level, not
at pre-school. Since at the time the bilingual program was designed and announced there
were students already in the pre-school level at the selected schools, their parents’ school
choices were made three years prior to that moment, when the program did not exist and
was not even planned. For this reason the differences between the first cohort of treated
students and the previous cohorts cannot be related to the introduction of the program.
The program started with children in the first grade of the selected primary schools in
the school year 2004/05 and left others in the same school, and all in the remaining schools,
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untreated. The program progressed with their school training for those treated students.
Successive cohorts from the treated schools have also been treated, and additional primary
schools joined the program in successive years, always starting the treatment with first
graders. Our data covers only the schools from the first cohort. Once the students from
the 2004/05 cohort reached secondary education (in 2010/11), a second phase kicked in
and some high schools joined the program. Since that phase of the program is still in
progress, we will not be able to analyze it.
The program was initiated in 2004 with a call for applications by schools, of which 25
were selected in the first year7, with initial plans for extension up to 110, which were later
expanded to the present 276 due to the high demand (out of a total of about 740 public
schools). A school wishing to be selected for the program had to submit an application.
The three criteria used to evaluate those applications are:
1. Degree of acceptance of the educational community expressed through the support
received by the application by the school teachers and the School Board (a decision
making body composed of the principal and elected teachers and parents).
2. Feasibility of the application. This will take into account the previous experience of
the school (some schools had started small pilot programs on their own), teaching
staff, particularly the teachers with an English specialization, the school resources
and the number of classes and students.
3. Balanced distribution of selected schools between the different geographical areas,
taking into account the school population between three and sixteen.
The selected schools were not the 25 that best meet the first two criteria because of
the criterion for geographical equity. However, the selected schools had all close to top
grades in those criteria.
For the schools that were selected into the program in the following years, from 2005
onwards, the criteria used in the evaluation changed in one significant way. The former
rule 3. was replaced by
3’. English level of the teachers in the school. This level is verified either with some official
certificate (such as those awarded by the University of Cambridge) that accredits a
sufficient level of command of the English language or by an evaluation done directly
by the education department of the regional government.
The balanced distribution is still mentioned as a desirable property of the allocation
but it is not given explicit points.
The order calls bilingual a school where the language of instruction is English during
at least one third of the school time, and where English language classes take 5 weekly
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Table 1: Weekly schedule by area in primary school
Number of weekly hours
First cycle Second cycle Third cycle
Areas 1st Grade 2nd Grade 3rd Grade 4th Grade 5th Grade 6th Grade
Know. Environ. 4 4 4 4 4 4
Art 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Physical Educ. 3 3 3 3 2.5 2.5
Spanish Language 5 5 5 5 5 5
Foreign Language 2 2 2.5 2.5 3 3
Mathematics 4 4 4 4 4 4
Culture, religion 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Recess 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Total 25 25 25 25 25 25
periods (of 45 to 60 minutes). It explicitly excludes the Spanish language and Mathematics
classes from being taught in English.
In Table 1 we describe the weekly curriculum from first to sixth grade so that it
becomes clear the margin of autonomy in the number of teaching hours.
With Knowledge of the Environment (a subject encompassing science, geography and
history) plus 5 periods of English, the minimum is accomplished. Different schools choose
whether to increase the English instruction by also teaching in that language Art, Physical
Education and Religion (or its alternative for those not wanting Religion, which is mostly
a class in social norms and culture). Whether English instruction is expanded from the
minimum depends on the availability of teachers, but most schools end up having above
40 percent of the instruction in English.
The program is certainly not costless. The teachers involved in it receive a complement
over their basic wage based on the “extra dedication that results in a longer workday,
due to the higher demands imposed by the activities of class preparation, processing
and adaptation of materials into other languages, and regular attendance at coordination
meetings outside school hours.” The extra work is estimated by the order to be “on
average of three hours per week for teachers, and four hours for coordinators.” The order
does not say how the administration arrived at this estimate. To compensate for the
extra dedication the coordinators of the program in each school receive 1,980 euros a
year; a teacher who teaches more than 15 hours in English, for subjects different than
English language, 1,500 euros; between 8 and 15 hours, 1,125 euros; and less than 8 hours,
750 euros. The program provides “conversation assistants” to schools, typically college
students from English speaking countries. Finally, the program provides training courses
in English for teachers, both in Spain and abroad. In the latter case, the program covers
7In fact, there were 26 schools that became bilingual in 2004/05, out of which we have enough infor-
mation on 25 schools.
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transportation, living expenses and fees for English schools, mostly in the UK and Ireland.
In order to teach in English, the teachers have to be either specialists in English or pass
an exam. The exam is divided in two parts. The first part is a written exam, where they
are tested on reading, writing and listening comprehension, plus vocabulary and grammar.
The second part is oral and involves a 20 minutes conversation with the examiner.
3 Description of Data and Econometric Model
3.1 Description of Data
Our data comes from a standardized exam that has been administered each year in all
primary schools from the Spanish region of Madrid to 6th grade students (12-13 years
of age), starting with the school year 2004/05.8 The exam is called CDI (prueba de
Conocimientos y Destrezas Indispensables), which means ”Indispensable Knowledge and
Skills Exam”. It is compulsory for all schools (public, private or charter). Like the OECD’s
PISA exam, the CDI exam does not have any academic consequences for the student, it
is only intended to give additional information to teachers, parents and students.
The exam consists of two parts of 45 minutes each: the first part includes tests of
Dictation, Reading, Language and General Knowledge and the second part is composed
of mathematics exercises. We use as a measure of student achievement the exam scores,
standardized to the yearly mean, in General Knowledge (whose contents are close to the
subject “Knowledge of the Environment” which is taught in English) and in Reading and
Mathematics (which are taught in Spanish). The exams are conducted in Spanish for all
students, whether or not they were in a bilingual school.
Before taking the exam, a short questionnaire (see Appendix) is filled out by each
student. In the questionnaire the students are asked a few questions about themselves,
their parents and the environment in which they are living. The answers to these questions
provide rich information on individual characteristics of students: from the questionnaire
we obtain the age of the student; the country of birth, which we divide into Spain, China,
Latin America, Morocco, Romania and other, to have sufficiently many observations of
each category; the level of education of the parents; the occupation of the parents; the
composition of the household in which the students lives; and the age at which the student
started to go to school/kindergarten. From the exam we have information at student level
on gender, whether the student has any special educational needs and whether the student
has any disability.
Regarding the education of the parents, students were asked to provide this informa-
tion for both the mother and the father. In order to facilitate the interpretation we choose
the highest level of education between the mother and the father. We distinguish the fol-
lowing categories: university education, higher secondary education, vocational training,
8Since the school year 2009/10 the exam is also administered to all students in the third grade of
compulsory secondary education (14-15 years old).
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lower secondary education and no compulsory education. The same applies to the occu-
pation of the parents: since we have the occupation of both the mother and the father,
we choose the highest level between them. Thus, we differentiate between the following
categories: professional occupations (for example teacher, researcher, doctor, engineer,
lawyer, psychologist, artist, etc.); business and administrative occupations (for example
CEO, civil servant, etc.); and blue collar occupations (for example shop assistant, fireman,
construction worker, cleaning staff, etc.).9
The variable on the composition of the household of the student comes from the answers
to the question: “With whom do you usually live?”. We differentiate the following seven
categories: lives only with the mother, lives with the mother and one sibling, lives with
the mother and more than one sibling, lives with the mother and the father, lives with
the mother and the father and one sibling, lives with the mother and the father and more
than one sibling and other situations.
For our empirical analysis we use data of the first cohort of bilingual schools in the
region of Madrid which started first grade of primary school in 2004/05, and took the CDI
exam in 2009/10 (25 schools).
In order to control for the endogeneity problems caused by self-selection of students
and schools which we will explain below, we use a Difference in Difference approach. We
compare the performance of children in the treated schools before and after they became
bilingual with the group of non-bilingual schools before and after the treatment. Thus,
we employ the data for 2008/09 and 2009/10 cohorts. The four groups that we analyze
are the following: the group of bilingual schools in 2008/09 (the treatment group before
the change), the group of non-bilingual schools in 2008/09 (the control group before the
change), the group of bilingual schools in 2009/10 (the treatment group after the change)
and the group of non-bilingual schools in 2009/10 (the control group after the change).
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of these four groups. If we compare the schools
where the bilingual program was introduced, before and after the treatment, we see an
increase in the proportion of students with characteristics that are positively correlated
with academic performance. More concretely, the proportion of children whose parents
have university education increases from 33% to 39%, the proportion of children whose
parents have lower secondary education decreases from 26% to 22% and the proportion
of children whose parents did not finish compulsory studies also decreases from 8% to
5%. There are also important changes with regards to the occupations of the parents of
children from these two cohorts: the proportion of children whose parents have professional
occupations increases from 24% to 29% and the proportion of children whose parents have
blue collar occupations decreases from 58% to 51%.
Furthermore, there is an increase in the proportion of Spanish students from the
2008/09 group to the 2009/10 group from 81% to 87%, which translates in a decrease
in the proportion of immigrant students (the most important change is in the reduction
of the proportion of Latin American students from 10% to 6%, whose performance is gen-
9Robustness checks using separately the education of each parent yield very similar results.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics benchmark
Treat. bef. Cont. bef. Treat. aft. Cont. aft. Diff-in-Diff
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean
Subjects
Dictation 5.29 5.59 7.90 7.89 0.31
Mathematics 8.94 9.54 10.55 10.88 0.26
Language 10.44 10.87 14.60 14.84 0.18
Reading 2.87 2.93 3.53 3.59 0.01
General knowledge 2.28 2.35 3.17 3.37 -0.13
Subjects - standard. 0.00
Dictation -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
Mathematics -0.11 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.05
Language -0.08 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.03
Reading -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00
General knowledge -0.05 0.00 -0.15 0.00 -0.11
Individual charac.
Female 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.01
Stud. with special ed. 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.06 -0.04
Student with disab. 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01
Student’s age 12.15 12.14 12.12 12.14 -0.04
Student Spain 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.81 0.06
Student Romania 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01
Student Morocco 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Student Lat.Am. 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.10 -0.03
Student China 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Student other 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.01
Parent education
Univ. 0.33 0.48 0.39 0.47 0.07
Higher secondary 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.18 -0.02
Vocational training 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.01
Lower secondary 0.26 0.17 0.22 0.17 -0.04
Did not finish comp. 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 -0.02
Parent profession
Business, civil serv. 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.02
Professional 0.24 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.05
Blue Collar 0.58 0.46 0.51 0.45 -0.06
Age start. sch.
Start school before 3 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.02
Pre-school 3-5 0.49 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.00
Start school at 6 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.01
Start sch. after 6 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01
Obs. Schools 25 1201 25 1217
Obs. Students 1135 55793 1145 53150
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erally worse than that of Spanish students or even of other immigrants, after conditioning
on observables (Anghel and Cabrales, 2010)). We also detect an increase in the percentage
of children who started school before 3 years from 46% to 51%.
However, if we look at the control group we do not see any important changes in
the composition of cohorts from one year to another: these proportions remain almost
constant in both years (at most there is a difference of one decimal).
The numbers presented above suggest that there could be an endogenous change in
the characteristics of the students enrolled in the bilingual schools, before and after the
treatment. This change involves an improvement in student characteristics like the level
of education and the occupation of parents or their nationality, which are known to be
determinants of the academic performance of children.10
Moreover, the change in observable characteristics from one year to the next suggests
that, apart from the treatment, there could be a change in unobservable characteristics.
To find out whether this is the case, we analyze further data about the students in these
bilingual schools.
A possible explanation for the changes between cohorts could come from students who
entered in, or dropped out of, these schools after they became bilingual. These flows of
students could generate some of the changes we observe. To check this theory, we obtained
the list of children who attended the treated schools since they were five years old, the
last year of pre-school education.
With that list, first, we analyze the group of schools where the number of children who
entered after they became bilingual (that is, children who were not enrolled in that school
when they were 5 years old) is less than 4 (that is about 16 percent in the average class
of 25). We consider these schools as schools with a small number of incoming students,
and the socioeconomic composition of the cohorts should not vary much from one year to
the next one. There are eight treated schools that satisfy this condition. As before, we
compare these schools before they became bilingual (the 2008/09 cohort) and after they
became bilingual (the 2009/10 cohort) and we use as a control group the group of non-
bilingual schools (we drop from the descriptive statistics the other 17 bilingual schools).
The descriptive analysis in Table 3 shows a very similar picture to the one in Table
2. We see that the change in the characteristics of students from the year in which they
became bilingual to the next one goes in the same direction and is quantitatively similar
as for the whole sample. We observe an important increase in the proportion of students
whose parents have university degrees, from 27% in the 2008/09 cohort to 36% in the
2009/10 cohort, and a decrease in the proportion of students whose parents did not finish
compulsory education (from 8% to 5%). We also identify a small increase in the proportion
of students whose parents have professional occupations and a small drop in the proportion
of students whose parents have blue collar occupations. Furthermore, there is an increase
in the proportion of Spanish students from one cohort to the next one in the treated
schools and there is a big drop in the proportion of Latin American students. Finally, the
10In the case of Madrid and for this same CDI exam this is shown in Anghel and Cabrales (2010).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics Schools with few movements
8 sch. before 8 sch. after
Variable Mean Mean
Subjects
Dictation 5.46 7.97
Mathematics 8.73 10.48
Language 10.65 14.68
Reading 2.92 3.61
General knowledge 2.28 3.11
Subjects - standard.
Dictation -0.04 0.03
Mathematics -0.15 -0.07
Language -0.04 -0.04
Reading -0.01 0.02
General knowledge -0.05 -0.20
Individual charac.
Female 0.49 0.50
Stud. with special ed. 0.08 0.07
Student with disab. 0.05 0.04
Student’s age 12.17 12.12
Student Spain 0.85 0.93
Student Romania 0.02 0.01
Student Morocco 0.01 0.00
Student Lat.Am. 0.10 0.05
Student China 0.00 0.00
Student other 0.03 0.01
Parent education
Univ. 0.27 0.36
Higher secondary 0.20 0.22
Vocational training 0.15 0.12
Lower secondary 0.31 0.25
Did not finish comp. 0.08 0.05
Parent profession
Business, civil serv. 0.17 0.20
Professional 0.23 0.26
Blue Collar 0.60 0.54
Age start. sch.
Start school before 3 0.46 0.55
Pre-school 3-5 0.52 0.44
Start school at 6 0.02 0.01
Start sch. after 6 0.01 0.00
Obs. Schools 8 8
Obs. Students 416 434
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percentage of children who started to go to kindergarten before three years old increases
by six percentage points (from 44% to 50%). Altogether, the selection problem that we
detected with the full sample persists in the sample of eight schools with very few incoming
students after they became bilingual.
Second, we restrict further the group of students we analyze, by studying only the
characteristics of the group of children that were already enrolled in the 25 treated schools
since they were five years of age and started the bilingual education program in these
schools. The introduction of the bilingual education program was not announced in ad-
vance of enrolling those children in the treated schools, so there should not be any changes
in the characteristics of the treated children endogenous to the treatment. This analysis
produces almost identical conclusions as in the previous cases (Table 4): we detect an
increase in the proportion of students with characteristics that are positively correlated
with their academic performance and this fact reveals once again a selection problem.
Third, we analyze the group of new incoming children in the 25 schools that became
bilingual in 2004/05, in order to see whether their demographic characteristics could be a
partial source of endogeneity.
From Table 5 it is clear that these students have a socio-economic background which
is very similar to the one of the remaining students of the bilingual schools. There is only
one exception; it looks like the proportion of immigrant students among the new incoming
students is significantly higher: about 29% of the new incoming students are immigrants
(out of which 12% are Latin Americans) while only 13% of all students in the bilingual
schools are immigrants (out of which 6% are Latin American).
Finally, we examine the sample of schools that applied unsuccessfully to the call for
the bilingual education program, and whose score was very close to the cut-off for being
part of the program. There are 38 schools that satisfy these conditions. If these schools
are similar to the schools that became part of the program, they would represent a better
control group than the whole group of schools. In addition, if we see for those schools a
similar change in demographics from one year to the next one as the change that we see
for our treated group, this could indicate that the explanation for this change does not
necessarily lie in the introduction of the bilingual education program.
The descriptive statistics of these schools in Table 6 reveal that both hypotheses are
partially valid. First, these schools are more similar in demographics to the treated bilin-
gual schools than to the schools from the complete control group (comparison with column
3 from Table 2). However, there are differences: the most important difference is that the
proportion of Latin American students in this new group of schools is bigger than in the
bilingual schools. Secondly, the characteristics of children change from the 2008/09 cohort
to the 2009/10 cohort in the same direction as they change for the bilingual schools for
those cohorts, even though these changes are a bit smaller than in the bilingual schools.
There is one striking phenomenon regarding this group of schools. The average scores
of their students are significantly lower than the scores of the students of the bilingual
schools in the year before the treatment (2008/09). However, in the 2009/10 CDI exam,
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics children who did not move
Treat. Bef. Cont. Bef. Treat. Aft. Cont. Aft. Diff-in-Diff
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean
Subjects
Dictation 5.29 5.59 8.04 7.89 -0.45
Mathematics 8.94 9.54 10.54 10.88 -0.25
Language 10.44 10.87 14.76 14.84 -0.35
Reading 2.87 2.93 3.57 3.59 -0.05
General knowledge 2.28 2.35 3.16 3.37 0.14
Subjects - standard.
Dictation -0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.14
Mathematics -0.11 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.05
Language -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.06
Reading -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.03
General knowledge -0.05 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.12
Individual charac. 0.00
Female 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.02
Stud. with special ed. 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06
Student with disab. 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01
Student’s age 12.15 12.14 12.09 12.15 0.07
Student Spain 0.81 0.81 0.93 0.81 -0.11
Student Romania 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Student Morocco 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Student Lat.Am. 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.06
Student China 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Student other 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03
Parent education
Univ. 0.33 0.48 0.38 0.47 -0.05
Higher secondary 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.02
Vocational training 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 -0.01
Lower secondary 0.26 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.02
Did not finish comp. 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02
Parent profession
Business, civil serv. 0.17 0.22 0.20 0.22 -0.02
Professional 0.24 0.33 0.27 0.33 -0.02
Blue Collar 0.58 0.46 0.53 0.45 0.05
Age start. sch.
Start school before 3 0.46 0.51 0.52 0.54 -0.03
Pre-school 3-5 0.49 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.00
Start school at 6 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02
Start sch. after 6 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Obs. Schools. 25 1201 25 1217
Obs. Students 1135 55973 849 53150
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics children who moved
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Subjects
Dictation 7.55 2.99
Mathematics 10.62 5.86
Language 14.23 4.83
Reading 3.42 1.50
General knowledge 3.26 1.24
Subjects - standard.
Dictation -0.13 1.10
Mathematics -0.05 1.07
Language -0.14 1.09
Reading -0.11 1.05
General knowledge -0.08 0.98
Individual charac.
Female 0.49 0.50
Stud. with special ed. 0.12 0.33
Student with disab. 0.03 0.16
Student’s age 12.21 0.45
Student Spain 0.71 0.46
Student Romania 0.05 0.21
Student Morocco 0.02 0.14
Student Lat.Am. 0.12 0.33
Student China 0.01 0.09
Student other 0.10 0.30
Parent education
Univ. 0.44 0.50
Higher secondary 0.19 0.39
Vocational training 0.13 0.34
Lower secondary 0.18 0.38
Did not finish comp. 0.06 0.25
Parent profession
Business, civil serv. 0.20 0.40
Professional 0.35 0.48
Blue Collar 0.45 0.50
Age start. sch.
Start school before 3 0.47 0.50
Pre-school 3-5 0.46 0.50
Start school at 6 0.05 0.22
Start sch. after 6 0.02 0.14
Obs. Schools 26
Obs. Students 341
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics - Schools that applied to become a bilingual school and
scored high in the selection criteria
Variable Mean in CDI exam 2008/09 Mean in CDI exam 2009/10
Subjects
Dictation 4.79 7.62
Mathematics 8.32 10.31
Language 9.32 14.47
Reading 2.46 3.51
General knowledge 2.06 3.34
Subjects - standard.
Dictation -0.23 -0.10
Mathematics -0.22 -0.10
Language -0.29 -0.08
Reading -0.32 -0.06
General knowledge -0.20 -0.02
Individual charac.
Female 0.47 0.47
Stud. with special ed. 0.09 0.09
Student with disab. 0.04 0.05
Student’s age 12.20 12.18
Student Spain 0.71 0.72
Student Romania 0.04 0.04
Student Morocco 0.01 0.02
Student Lat.Am. 0.17 0.16
Student China 0.00 0.01
Student other 0.06 0.06
Parent education
Univ. 0.38 0.39
Higher secondary 0.20 0.21
Vocational training 0.11 0.11
Lower secondary 0.21 0.21
Did not finish comp. 0.10 0.07
Parent profession
Business, civil serv. 0.19 0.17
Professional 0.22 0.27
Blue Collar 0.59 0.56
Age start. sch.
Start school before 3 0.46 0.52
Pre-school 3-5 0.49 0.44
Start school at 6 0.03 0.02
Start sch. after 6 0.02 0.02
Obs. Schools 38 38
Obs. Students 1341 1292
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the scores of the students in these schools improve considerably, reaching almost the same
levels as the scores of the students in the bilingual schools from 2009/10.
Nevertheless, given the similarities between this group of schools and the treated
schools, in the next section, as a robustness check, we will use this group of schools
as a control group.
These descriptive analyses show that there has been an important change in the com-
position of the bilingual schools once they became bilingual, while in the control group of
non-bilingual schools we do not see such differences. The self-selection problem that we
possibly face in the case of the bilingual schools could contaminate our estimates, therefore
we need to use econometric techniques that mitigate that problem.
3.2 Econometric model of education production
3.2.1 Model and endogeneity problems
Here we use as the outcome for primary education the standardized scores of students in
the CDI exam described in section 3.1. For a given year, the score in that test for student
i in school j, yij , is determined by:
yij = δbilj + βxi + vj + ui + ξij (1)
where xi are the observable characteristics of students and their families described in
section 3.1, bilj indicates whether school j participated in the bilingual program, ui are
unobservable characteristics of the students, such as effort or ability, vj are characteristics
of the school, like quality of the Principal and teachers, and ξij is a random shock. Our
parameter of interest is the average effect of the bilingual program on yij , which in equation
(1) is captured by δ. The difficulty that we face when we run the regression of yij on bilj
and xi is that we could suffer from an endogeneity bias because of two self-selection
problems:
1. Students are not randomly assigned to schools. Their parents choose school. If
there is no excess of demand for the school they have chosen, they are admitted. If
there is excess of demand, the admission is based on criteria like proximity of the
family home to the school and family income, both of which are not random and are
correlated with school outcomes.
2. Schools are not randomly selected to implement the bilingual program. The program
was implemented only in (some of the) schools that applied for it. An application
could be a positive signal of quality of the principal and teachers, because of the
significant amount of extra work required by the program. It could also be a sign
that the school had low demand (perhaps due to low quality) with teachers about
to be displaced.11
11In Spain a large majority of teachers are civil servants and cannot be fired. But they can be moved be-
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3.2.2 Estimation strategy
To control for the endogeneity problem caused by the self-selection of schools and students
explained, we use Difference in Differences estimation (diff-in-diff). This solves the self-
selection of schools into the program because we observe the same school the first year
the bilingual program is implemented in sixth grade and the year before. Given the
institutional framework, the only significant changes in resources and staff from one year
to the next are those associated with the bilingual program.
With respect to the self-selection of students, the diff-in-diff strategy also helps to
solve this problem. As we mentioned in section 2 since the admission rules to primary
school gives precedence to pre-schoolers in that same school, and given the timing of
announcement of the program, the differences between the first cohort of treated students
and the previous cohorts cannot be related to the introduction of the program. Given
this observation, if the movements of students in bilingual schools after the program was
introduced were the same as in the absence of the program (i.e. the same changes as in
non treated schools) a diff-in-diff strategy would control for the students being differently
distributed between treated and untreated schools. However, as one can see in Table 2
and we discussed in section 3.1, there is a change in the characteristics of the students
in bilingual schools after the program was introduced. Fortunately the diff-in-diff easily
allows us to incorporate observable characteristics of students in the estimation to control
for this changes.
Given the diff-in-diff strategy, we are going to estimate the following regressions by
OLS:
yij = α0 + a1bilj + α2y10 + δy10 · bilj + εij (2)
yij = α0 + a1bilj + α2y10 + δy10 · bilj + βxi + εij (3)
where y10 is a dummy variable for the academic year 2009/10, the first year when we
observe the children exposed to the bilingual education program in the CDI exam. Also,
we will study further whether the change in the student population in bilingual schools is
affecting our estimates by checking the robustness of our results to other comparisons and
ways of estimating the effect of the program.
4 Results
4.1 Main estimates
In Table 7 we present estimates of models (2) and (3). The parameter associated with
the variable Bilingual school 2004/05 in CDI exam 2009/10 (y10 · bilj) gives the effect
of the program we want to estimate. Without covariates the effect of the program is
tween schools within a region. Even in a small region like Madrid, this can entail substantial inconvenience
and they would be willing to do significant efforts to avoid school closures.
18
Table 7: Diff-in-Diff with and without covariates. All students in the sample.
Mathematics Reading General Knowledge
Constant 0.002 4.517*** 0.001 3.093*** 0.001 3.391***
(0.015) (0.132) (0.014) (0.132) (0.014) (0.137)
Year 2010 -0.001 -0.073*** 0.000 -0.084*** 0.002 -0.072***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Bilingual school 2004/05 -0.110 -0.006 -0.043 0.053 -0.046 0.069
(0.074) (0.058) (0.096) (0.091) (0.093) (0.094)
Bilingual school 2004/05 0.053 -0.068 0.002 -0.110 -0.096 -0.229**
in CDI exam 2009/10 (0.075) (0.069) (0.096) (0.099) (0.102) (0.112)
Female -0.157*** -0.035*** -0.176***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Student with special -0.744*** -0.702*** -0.620***
educational needs (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
Student with disability -1.080*** -1.127*** -0.892***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.025)
Student’s age -0.384*** -0.262*** -0.280***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Student Romania 0.036 0.017 0.061*
(0.027) (0.025) (0.031)
Student Morocco -0.053* -0.256*** -0.147***
(0.032) (0.038) (0.043)
Student Latin America -0.249*** -0.073*** -0.193***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
Student China 0.600*** -0.282*** -0.319***
(0.051) (0.054) (0.052)
Student other -0.129*** -0.031** -0.100***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Parent education - Univ. 0.340*** 0.273*** 0.249***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Parent education - 0.182*** 0.173*** 0.169***
Higher secondary (0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
Parent education - 0.181*** 0.204*** 0.184***
Vocational training (0.016) (0.019) (0.018)
Parent education - 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.102***
Lower secondary (0.015) (0.019) (0.017)
Parent occupation - 0.167*** 0.139*** 0.102***
Business, minister, city hall (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Parent occupation- 0.251*** 0.205*** 0.151***
Professional (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Lives only with the mother -0.099*** -0.080*** -0.079***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027)
Lives with the mother 0.071*** 0.034 0.030
and one sibling (0.025) (0.025) (0.029)
Lives with both parents 0.066*** 0.003 0.065**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.026)
continue in next page
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Table 7: Diff-in-Diff with and without covariates. All students in the sample (cont.)
Mathematics Reading General Knowledge
Lives with both parents 0.174*** 0.068*** 0.100***
and one sibling (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)
Lives with both parents 0.151*** 0.055** 0.063**
and more than one sibling (0.022) (0.023) (0.026)
Other situations 0.063*** 0.014 0.011
(0.022) (0.024) (0.026)
Kindergarten -0.072*** -0.034*** -0.054***
between 3 and 5 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Start school at 6 -0.220*** -0.188*** -0.195***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Start school at 7 or more -0.295*** -0.304*** -0.248***
(0.026) (0.032) (0.033)
Observations 111,128 92,100 111,268 92,268 111,268 92,268
Notes: Dependent variables are the individual standardized grades in each of the three subjects.
Standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
Base categories for dummies: male, student Spain, parent education - did not finish compulsory studies,
parent occupation - blue-collar, lives with the mother and more than one sibling, kindergarten less than 3
not significant for the three subjects. However, as we mentioned when presenting the
descriptive statistics of the data, the cohort of treated students has different characteristics
than the previous cohort in those schools. Those characteristics affect positively the
outcome; that is why the effect of the program is smaller once this change in observables is
taken into account. This change in the estimated effect of the program when introducing
covariates reflects the fact that there is selection in students after introducing the program.
For mathematics and reading the effect is not significantly different from zero in either
case, although it goes from positive to negative. For General Knowledge, the bilingual
program has a negative and significant effect over the score. This is the only exam related
to a subject taught in English of those measured in CDI exam. Therefore it looks like the
additional effort made to learn English by using it as a language of instruction in a subject
other than English comes at the cost of lower performance in learning that subject.
To make a more intensive and flexible use of observable characteristics, we estimate the
diff–in-diff regression by groups of students that have similar observable characteristics.
In this way the performance of treated students is compared with the performance of
students with the same observable characteristics in non treated periods and schools.
Table 8 reports results by parental education for those students that were born in Spain,
do not have any special educational needs, and are not older than 12 years old.12 These
represent more than two thirds of the population of students. In estimates not reported
1211-12 years is the theoretical age that corresponds with sixth grade, which is the grade at which the
CDI exam is taken (see subsection 3.1).
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Table 8: Separate Diff-in-Diff regressions for observable groups of students: estimated
treatment effect by group
Groups by parents General
education Mathematics Reading Knowledge Proportion
University -0.027 -0.117 -0.107 36.36%
(0.096) (0.128) (0.134)
Post-compulsory -0.083 -0.210 -0.259** 19.11%
secondary (0.121) (0.136) (0.120)
Compulsory -0.115 -0.062 -0.338** 12.33%
education or less (0.081) (0.134) (0.154)
Notes: Dependent variables are the individual standardized grades in each of the three subjects.
The sample used for these estimates are students of Spanish origin (i.e. non-immigrants), not older than
12 years and that do not have special education needs. They are divided by parents education in three
groups. Proportion is the % that each group represents over the total sample of students (including those
groups like students older than 12 years whose diff-in-diff estimates are not presented here.)
The following covariates were included in these regression though not reported: dummies for year of the
exam and bilingual schools, sex, occupation of the parents, composition of the household in which the
student lives and age at which the student started to go to school, preschool or daycare.
Standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
here for brevity, we use the parents’ profession to form groups in addition to education
variables, but the qualitative conclusion is the same. Other characteristics are included
as covariates in the regression, since it is not possible to construct totally homogeneous
groups. The estimates in this table are those of the parameter associated with the variable
Bilingual school 2004/05 in CDI exam 2009/10, that is, the effect of the program we want
to estimate. As with estimates with covariates in Table 7, we only find significant effects
for General Knowledge. However, these estimates by groups have the following features:
for Mathematics and General Knowledge the estimated effect is more negative for students
whose parents have a lower level of education; for Mathematics all of them continue to
be non-significant, but for General Knowledge there is not a significant effect for students
whose parents have university education whereas it is significant for all the other students.
Moreover, the difference between the effect for the university group and the effect for the
compulsory education group is significantly different from zero at 10%. Surprisingly, for
Reading there is no clear pattern. In any case the effect over reading is not significant for
any of the groups.
4.2 Robustness checks
If the described changes in the population of treated students are only due to observable
characteristics, then estimates of equation (3) are correctly identifying the average effect
of the program. However, to check the robustness of these estimates, in this section we
explore further the potential reasons that could lead to an endogenous change in the
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population of treated students, with respect to non-treated students. Even though the
beginning of the program was not anticipated, the treatment lasted for six years until we
observed our outcome variable and during that period the following movements of students
may occur due to the program:
1. In any cohort of sixth grade students there is a proportion that had to repeat a
grade as a consequence of failing to make sufficient progress. If a student starting
primary education in 2003/04 were to repeat a grade in a bilingual school, he would
go from a non-bilingual education to a bilingual one. Most of the classmates of that
child would have started school in 2004/05 and, therefore, they would have already
participated in the bilingual program for some years. These repeaters may prefer, or
may be recommended to move to a school that does not have the bilingual program
in the grade they have to repeat. If this is the case, the treated cohort for which we
observe our outcome variable may have a smaller proportion of these repeaters. One
would expect this factor to improve the outcomes of the treated schools, and hence
its removal would tend to strengthen our results.
2. As a consequence of the bilingual program there could be more students repeating
a grade than in the previous cohort in the same school. We would not observe the
outcome for these repeaters because they are not yet in the sixth grade.
3. Other endogenous movements can be related with the fact that some of the treated
schools have vacancies. As mentioned in section 3.2 vacancies can be a reason for
a school to apply for the program. Having treated schools with vacancies gives
the opportunity to students with a good level of English, that otherwise might not
have attended these schools, to apply for one of the vacancies once the program has
started. Since the treatment we evaluate started six years before we measure the
outcome, new students could have been coming for these reasons during five years.13
4. Finally some students that were in a bilingual school when the program was imple-
mented might dislike the program and they could decide to change school at any
point between the year of introduction of the program and the outcome we observe.
We conjecture that once we have taken out repeaters from this cohort (whom we
do not observe even if they stay in the same school as we have already mentioned)
there is a very small proportion of students in this group. This is plausible because if
they decide to move they cannot go to a highly demanded school, since at this stage
they have all their vacancies filled. Nevertheless we do not have data to support our
guess.
For those students in bilingual schools taking the exam in 2009/10 (i.e. the treated
cohort) we know who was already at this school when they were five years old. For these
13This does not mean that all the newcomers will come because of this reason. Some movements of
students would have occurred regardless of the program (for example due to migration) and we control for
this by observing the same school before the program.
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Table 9: Diff-in-Diff with and without covariates. Bilingual schools with more than 16%
of the students coming to the school after being five years old are excluded.
Mathematics Reading General Knowledge
No x With x No x With x No x With x
Constant 0.002 4.536*** 0.001 3.098*** 0.001 3.421***
(0.015) (0.133) (0.014) (0.132) (0.014) (0.137)
Year 2010 -0.001 -0.073*** 0.000 -0.084*** 0.002 -0.072***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Bilingual school 2004/05 -0.151 -0.077 -0.013 0.086 -0.050 0.050
(0.128) (0.086) (0.220) (0.198) (0.150) (0.119)
Bilingual school 2004/05 0.077 -0.017 0.028 -0.092 -0.155 -0.273*
in CDI exam 2010 (0.116) (0.104) (0.214) (0.213) (0.122) (0.142)
Observations 109,654 90,892 109,793 91,059 109,793 91,059
Notes: Dependent variables are the individual standardized grades in each of the three subjects. Standard
errors clustered at school level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1% Though not reported, estimates with x include the same covariates as in Table 7.
students the implementation of the program was not known when deciding to enroll in this
school. We can use this information to detect bilingual schools with a very large proportion
of students in the treated cohort who stayed in the school since they were five years old.
This will avoid the bias due to new students coming to the school when the program was
already in place. We select the 8 bilingual schools that have a proportion of students that
were not in that school at five years old smaller or equal than 16%. Table 9 presents
estimates of equations (2) and (3) (i.e. Diff-in-diff estimates) using as treated group only
those eight schools and excluding from the sample the other 17 bilingual schools. The
results are similar to the results in Table 7 using the whole sample. The only difference is
that the estimated effects tend to be higher here, including a less negative effect on General
Knowledge. Furthermore, the same results are obtained when doing the Diff-in-diff using
as treated students only those that were at the treated schools before the announcement
and introduction of the program.
A different approach to the diff-in-diff is to find a control group of schools that is
as close as possible to the treated schools. We have information about the schools that
applied to the program and the criteria announced to choose schools, mentioned in section
2. In particular, among the 192 schools that applied, 64 schools had more than 60 points
(out of 70) in those criteria. The 25 selected were all from this group with scores above
60. The other 38 schools that were not selected but are comparable in these criteria form
a natural control group. By assuming that these are comparable groups, we do not have
to use the diff-in-diff strategy and we can run a regression using only the 2009/10 results
of the exam. To ensure an adequate comparison of the population of students in the
treated and control groups we include as covariates the characteristics of the students we
observe, and we also estimate by IV using as an instrument the indicator of having been
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Table 10: OLS and IV with Schools that applied to became a bilingual schools and scored
high in the selection criteria.
Mathematics Reading General Knowledge
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Constant 4.020*** 4.086*** 4.288*** 4.245*** 3.143*** 3.235***
(0.739) (0.739) (0.857) (0.849) (0.826) (0.811)
Bilingual school 2004/05 -0.070 -0.123 -0.081 -0.046 -0.186* -0.261**
in CDI exam 2009/10 (0.082) (0.093) (0.056) (0.060) (0.098) (0.110)
Female -0.249*** -0.247*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.182*** -0.179***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044)
Student with special -0.876*** -0.875*** -0.783*** -0.784*** -0.718*** -0.717***
educational needs (0.078) (0.077) (0.103) (0.101) (0.117) (0.116)
Student with disability -1.204*** -1.206*** -1.214*** -1.213*** -0.937*** -0.940***
(0.083) (0.083) (0.129) (0.127) (0.119) (0.118)
Student’s age -0.340*** -0.344*** -0.345*** -0.343*** -0.267*** -0.271***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.070) (0.069) (0.067) (0.065)
Student Latin America -0.251*** -0.264*** 0.061 0.069 0.012 -0.005
(0.082) (0.081) (0.073) (0.072) (0.085) (0.085)
Student China 0.777** 0.774** -0.031 -0.028 0.032 0.028
(0.372) (0.371) (0.263) (0.257) (0.220) (0.220)
Parent education - 0.242*** 0.243*** 0.279*** 0.278*** 0.232** 0.233**
University (0.086) (0.085) (0.101) (0.100) (0.093) (0.093)
Parent education - 0.080 0.081 0.210** 0.209** 0.143 0.145
Higher secondary (0.075) (0.075) (0.099) (0.098) (0.093) (0.094)
Parent education - 0.055 0.057 0.243** 0.241** 0.142 0.145
Vocational training (0.102) (0.102) (0.116) (0.114) (0.107) (0.107)
Parent education - -0.096 -0.095 0.128 0.127 -0.010 -0.007
Lower secondary (0.086) (0.086) (0.094) (0.093) (0.100) (0.100)
Parent occupation -Busi. 0.189*** 0.190*** 0.063 0.062 0.117** 0.120**
minister, city hall (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051)
Parent occupation- 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.088* 0.088**
Professional (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.045) (0.044)
Start school at 6 -0.463*** -0.454*** -0.196 -0.202 -0.162 -0.149
(0.150) (0.152) (0.205) (0.202) (0.200) (0.202)
Start school -0.405*** -0.410*** -0.003 -0.000 0.012 0.006
at 7 or more (0.125) (0.123) (0.219) (0.217) (0.167) (0.163)
Observations 2,177 2,177 2,192 2,192 2,192 2,192
R-squared 0.288 0.287 0.194 0.194 0.165 0.163
Notes: Dependent variables are the individual standardized grades in 2009/10 CDI exam in each of the
three subjects.
Standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
Reference categories for dummies and explanatory variables includes in the estimates are as in equations
with covariates in Table 7. However, explanatory variables with no significant coefficient in any equation
or those variables related with composition of the family living with the student are not reported here.
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at the same school when the student was five years old (i.e. having being assigned to
treatment). Table 10 contains these two estimates. Both OLS and IV estimates imply
the same qualitative conclusions as in the rest of the estimates presented: negative and
significant effect on General Knowledge of being in the bilingual program and no effect
significantly different from zero on mathematics and reading.
4.3 Estimates with an additional year of data
The estimates from sections 4.1 and 4.2 report the effect of the program on the first
cohort of students treated in the group of 25 schools that first implemented the program.
In 2009/10 this cohort finished sixth grade, the last year of primary education, and took
the CDI exam. We have used that exam as measure of the outcome. Likewise, we can use
the results of the sixth graders in the CDI exam in 2010/11 as the output for the second
cohort of students treated at those 25 schools, and the output for the first cohort of students
treated in the 54 schools selected in 2005/06 to implement the program.14 The availability
of this additional year of data allows us to test whether there are any improvements in
the second cohort of treated students in the first 25 schools. It also allows us to check
if our results for the schools selected in 2004 to participate are confirmed for the schools
selected in 2005, since, as explained in Section 2, there were some significant changes in
the selection criteria from one year to the next.
4.3.1 Results for the second cohort of students in the schools selected in
2004/05
The descriptive statistics for the second cohort of students (cohort of 2010/11) being
treated in the first 25 schools are very similar to those reported in Table 2 for the treated
cohort of 2009/10 and they are not reported here to save space. Table 11 reports the
estimated effect for this second treated cohort of students. The qualitative conclusion
is the same as with the first cohort of treated students, presented and discussed in the
previous two subsections. Quantitatively, the estimates tend to be greater (including a less
negative effect on General Knowledge) than those reported in Table 7, but the differences
are small. In any case, this small improvement in the second cohort is not enough to make
the negative average effect on General Knowledge insignificant.
4.3.2 Results for the first cohort of students in the schools selected in 2005/06
The descriptive statistics for the first cohort of treated students in the 54 schools selected
to implement the program in 2005/06 are in Table 12. The demographic characteristics of
the last cohort of non-treated students at these schools are closer to the general population
characteristics than those in the last non-treated cohort of the 25 schools. This can be seen
14Each new selected school starts implementing the program in the first grade and expands it to the
other grades, year by year, until all the primary education classes in those schools follow the bilingual
program.
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Table 11: Diff-in-Diff with and without covariates. Second class of students treated at the
25 schools selected to implement the bilingual program in 2004/05. Comparing CDI 2011
with CDI 2009.
Mathematics Reading General Knowledge
No x With x No x With x No x With x
Constant 0.006 4.451*** 0.007 2.859*** 0.004 3.548***
(0.015) (0.140) (0.014) (0.124) (0.015) (0.132)
Year 2011 -0.004 -0.022* -0.022* 0.067*** 0.001 -0.016
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Bilingual school 2004/05 -0.049 0.041 0.041 0.020 -0.049 0.075
(0.097) (0.092) (0.092) (0.04) (0.093) (0.094)
Bilingual school 2004/05 0.022 -0.082 -0.082 -0.027 -0.076 -0.210***
in CDI exam 2010/11 (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) (0.048) (0.090) (0.091)
Observations 110,939 91,681 110,966 91,705 110,966 91,705
Notes: Dependent variables are the individual standardized grades in each of the three subjects in 2009
and 2011. Standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%. Though not reported, estimates with x include the same covariates as in Table
7.
by looking at the differences between the first two columns in Table 12 and comparing it
with those differences in Table 2. Also, the change in demographic characteristics observed
when comparing the last non-treated cohort with the first treated cohort is slightly smaller
here than in the first 25 schools selected to implement the program.
Next, we look at the estimated effects of the treatment by observable groups of students
for the 54 schools that became bilingual in 2005/06. These estimates are reported in Table
13. We see that, as in the previous analysis for the first 25 schools selected, the effect is
not significantly different from zero in mathematics and reading. However, for General
Knowledge the effect is now non-significant. This change in the average estimated effect
could be due to a composition effect, since the effect is heterogeneous. As seen in Table 8
the effect is higher in absolute value the smaller the level of education of the parents. The
students at these 54 school have better socio-demographic characteristics than those at the
first 25 bilingual schools for which we detected a negative and significant effect in General
Knowledge. This is why we next look at the estimated effects by groups of observables.
We can see in Table 14 that here the effects in mathematics and reading continue being
not significant for any group. Also, as for the first 25 bilingual schools, in General Knowl-
edge the effect is heterogeneous, and it is clearly non-significant for those students whose
parents have a college degree, and negative and significant for those whose parents have
only compulsory education or less. However, there is an important difference with respect
to the estimated effect of the treatment in the first 25 schools presented in the previous
sections. The negative effect of the program is smaller (in absolute value) here. This
change implies that, for those students whose parents have post-compulsory secondary ed-
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics for the 2005/06 bilinguals schools
Treat. bef. Cont. bef. Treat. aft. Cont. aft. Diff-in-Diff
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean
Subjects
Dictation 7.61 7.90 3.54 3.70
Mathematics 10.44 10.91 5.61 5.90
Language 14.48 14.86 7.33 7.56
Reading 3.54 3.59 3.80 3.87
General knowledge 3.34 3.37 5.39 5.53
Subjects - standard.
Dictation -0.10 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.01
Mathematics -0.08 0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.00
Language -0.08 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.01
Reading -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.02
General knowledge -0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.03
Individual charac.
Female 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.49 -0.01
Stud. with special ed. 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.01
Student with disab. 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.00
Student’s age 12.17 12.14 12.13 12.15 -0.05
Student Spain 0.76 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.05
Student Romania 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
Student Morocco 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Student Lat.Am. 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.09 -0.03
Student China 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Student other 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.01
Parent education
Univ. 0.39 0.48 0.45 0.49 0.05
Higher secondary 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.18 -0.01
Vocational training 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.01
Lower secondary 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.16 -0.03
Did not finish comp. 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.02
Parent profession
Business, civil serv. 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.02
Professional 0.27 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.02
Blue Collar 0.55 0.44 0.50 0.44 -0.05
Age start. sch.
Start school before 3 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.03
Pre-school 3-5 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.42 -0.03
Start school at 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01
Start sch. after 6 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02
Obs. Schools 54 1163 54 1179
Obs. Students 2074 51076 2072 54807
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Table 13: Diff-in-Diff with and without covariates. First class of students treated at the
54 schools selected to implement the bilingual program in 2005/06.
Mathematics Reading General Knowledge
No x With x No x With x No x With x
Constant 0.005 5.175*** 0.002 3.265*** 0.004 3.718***
(0.015) (0.139) (0.012) (0.136) (0.014) (0.138)
Year 2011 -0.000 0.041*** 0.000 0.067*** 0.001 0.058***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Bilingual school 2005/06 -0.084 0.005 -0.037 0.020 -0.025 0.069
(0.065) (0.050) (0.056) (0.040) (0.074) (0.064)
Bilingual school 2005/06 -0.014 -0.058 -0.014 -0.027 -0.031 -0.084
in CDI exam 2010/11 (0.063) (0.058) (0.049) (0.048) (0.069) (0.066)
Observations 109919 95892 110029 96034 110029 96034
Notes: Dependent variables are the individual standardized grades in each of the three subjects in 2010
and 2011. Standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%. Though not reported, estimates with x include the same covariates as in Table
7.
ucation the effect of the program in General Knowledge is now not significantly different
from zero. The estimated effect is now -0.033 and in Table 8 it was -0.259.15 Also, all the
other estimates for the effect in General Knowledge (column 3 in Table 14) and most of
the other estimates in this Table are much smaller (in absolute value) than the estimated
effects for the first 25 schools.
What can explain the different effects of the program found between the 25 schools
selected to implement the program in 2004/05 and the 54 schools selected in 2005/06?
Given that the characteristics of the students are different in these two groups of schools,
the differential effect might be capturing positive peer effects in the 54 schools. To check
this hypothesis we estimate our models including as explanatory variables the average
parent’s education levels of the students in each school. These variables are not signifi-
cantly different from zero and the estimated effects of the policy do not change. Another
explanation could be that those selected in 2005/06 are more suited and better prepared to
implement the program so that the negative effect observed in the 25 schools is mitigated.
As explained in section 2, in 2005/06 the English level of teachers in candidate schools
was evaluated with an exam and the result in that exam was part of the criteria used to
select schools. This may imply that the schools selected in 2005/06 were more prepared
to teach in English. If this hypothesis is correct, it would imply that a great part of the
negative effect found for the 25 bilingual schools from 2004/05 is due to an insufficient
previous English training of the teachers in the schools selected. This is only a conjecture,
which at this point we cannot test with the data available to us.
15A test of equality of these two estimated effects rejects the null hypothesis of equality of effects.
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Table 14: Diff-in-Diff for the 2005/06 schools. Estimated treatment effects using separate
regressions by observable groups of students.
Groups by parents General
education Mathematics Reading Knowledge Proportion
University -0.101 -0.069 -0.017 37.53%
(0.076) (0.061) (0.076)
Post-compulsory -0.005 -0.014 -0.033 19.92%
secondary (0.074) (0.086) (0.085)
Compulsory -0.058 -0.098 -0.196* 11.76%
education or less (0.128) (0.067) (0.110)
Notes: Dependent variables are the individual standardized grades in each of the three subjects in CDI
exams in 2010 and 2011.
The sample used for these estimates are students of Spanish origin (i.e. non-immigrants), not older than
12 years and that do not have special education needs. They are divided by parents education in three
groups. Proportion is the % that each group represents over the total sample of students (including those
groups like students older than 12 years whose diff-in-diff estimates are not presented here.)
The following covariates were included in these regression though not reported: dummies for year of the
exam and bilingual schools, sex, occupation of the parents, composition of the household in which the
student lives and age at which the student started to go to school, preschool or daycare.
Standard errors clustered at school level in parentheses. * significant at 10%.
5 Concluding Remarks
All our estimates controlling for observable students’ characteristics and using different
ways for controlling self-selection in order to isolate the effect of the bilingual program
on Mathematics, Reading, and General Knowledge lead to the same conclusion: there is
a clear negative effect, and quantitatively substantial, on learning the subject taught in
English, and no effect significantly different from zero on mathematical and reading (in
Spanish) skills. The outcome variable used to measure learning in these three subjects is a
general standardized exam on the basic skills that any student in sixth grade is supposed
to have acquired during the primary school years.
Two aspects of the results are particularly important because of their potential policy
implications. The first one is that the negative effects are concentrated on the children of
less educated parents. The second one is that the negative effect is much larger (in absolute
value) for the group of schools that started participating in 2004 than for those that started
in 2005. This even makes the negative effect not significantly different from zero on average
and for the students whose parent have more than lower-secondary education. From 2004
to 2005 there was a change in the rules that increased the required English knowledge of
the teachers at participating schools. It would be worth ascertaining to which extent this
is the cause of the decrease in the negative impact.
Given the change in observable characteristics of the students after the introduction
of the program, a change in unobservable characteristics might be suspected. This might
bias our estimates. Given the different sources of the change in the population of students
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in bilingual schools, the direction of the bias is uncertain. However, it is not unreasonable
to assume that the change in unobservable characteristics is the same as in the observable
ones. If that were the case, this would reinforce our negative and significant effect on
General Knowledge and it might turn the estimated insignificant effect on mathematics
and reading into a negative and significant effect. On the other hand, if observables and
unobservables are positively correlated, the observable characteristics should already be
picking up much of the effect of unobservables and for this reason the effect of the program
would not differ much from our current estimates, especially if the positive correlation be-
tween observables and unobservables is very high. The difficulties we experience in being
certain about the effects of the policy is a stark reminder about the necessity of intro-
ducing policies in a way that makes it possible its correct evaluation. This is particularly
unforgivable in a context like the present one, when the policy was introduced gradually
and the applicants were all quite similar.
This study is based only on the first two cohorts of students finishing primary education
in the bilingual program. The addition of more cohorts and more schools in future years
may allow for a more detailed analysis. One particularly worthwhile aspect for further
research is the reaction of parents when choosing schools once it is known at the time
of entering preschool that the school is part of the bilingual program. We might observe
a marked segregation of students. This will be specially strong in secondary education,
when having performed well in the bilingual program is a requirement to enroll in bilingual
sections of High schools. The long run effect of the program, and the potential segregation
are important avenues for further research.
Finally, as mentioned in the Introduction, the fact that Admiraal, Westhoff and de
Bot (2006) found no effect of a similar program on secondary education students in The
Netherlands opens the additional question of what is the best age for introducing a program
like this.
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